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Using the International Space Station (ISS)  
Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) Is Not Feasible  
for Mars Transit 
Harry W. Jones1  
NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, 94035-0001 
A review of two papers on improving the International Space Station (ISS) Oxygen 
Generation Assembly (OGA) shows that it would not save substantial mass on a Mars 
transit. The ISS OGA requires redesign for satisfactory operation, even for the ISS. The 
planned improvements of the OGA for ISS would not be sufficient to make it suitable for 
Mars, because Mars transit life support has significantly different requirements than ISS. 
The OGA for Mars should have lower mass, better reliability and maintainability, greater 
safety, radiation hardening, and capability for quiescent operation. NASA’s methodical, 
disciplined systems engineering process should be used to develop the appropriate system.  
Nomenclature 
AAA  = Avionics Air Assembly 
ACTEX = Activated Carbon/Ion Exchange 
DI   = Deionizing 
dP   = delta Pressure 
ECLSS = Environmental control and Life Support System 
ESM = Equivalent System Mass (ESM) 
H2   = Hydrogen 
ISM  = Independent Shutdown Monitor 
ISS   = International Space Station 
IX   = Ion Exchange 
LCC  = Life Cycle Cost 
LFL  = Lower Flammability Limit 
MDM  = Multiplexer/Demultiplexer 
MTBF = Mean Time Before Failure 
NASA  = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
O, O2  = Oxygen 
OGA  = Oxygen Generation Assembly 
OGS  = Oxygen Generation System 
ORU  = Orbital Replacement Unit 
PSM  = Power Supply Module 
R&R  = Remove and Replace 
RSA = Rotary Separator Accumulator 
SSF = Space Station Freedom 
SOA = State of the Art  
TOC  = Total Organic Carbon 
WRS  = Water Recovery System 
I. Introduction 
HIS report reviews two recent papers that investigate how the Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) that is now 
on the International Space Station (ISS) can be used for future long duration missions and the journey to Mars. 
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Life support systems that recycle water and oxygen for long duration missions were first developed in the Apollo era 
for future missions. The current Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) design that has been 
operational on ISS for several years was originally developed for Space Station Freedom (SSF) before the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. A similar system is expected be used on future long duration missions. The question here is, 
“Can we use the ISS OGA for Mars?” The reviewed papers are optimistic.  
The first reviewed paper by Takada, Ghariani, and Van Keuren titled “Advancing the Oxygen Generation 
Assembly Design to Increase Reliability and Reduce Costs for a Future Long Duration Mission,” states that 
“Lessons learned from operating the ISS OGA have led to proposing incremental improvements to advance the 
baseline design for use in a future long duration mission.” And, “A future OGA system for exploration should 
logically be based on the state of the art (SOA) ISS OGA. Since the ISS OGA has proven to be extremely safe and 
reliable over eight years of operation, it will provide an excellent foundation for the design of a future system. 
However, certain incremental improvements based on lessons learned should be considered.” (Takada et al., 2015-
115)  
The second paper by Bagdigian, Dake, Gentry, and Gault titled, “International Space Station Environmental 
Control and Life Support System Mass and Crewtime Utilization In Comparison to a Long Duration Human Space 
Exploration Mission,” takes a more tentative initial approach. It says, “An important question … is how well suited 
is the ISS ECLSS suite of technologies to meeting the needs of future missions?” These authors conclude that, 
“With several readily apparent exceptions, … OGS equipment has been shown to be capable of achieving 
operational lifetimes on the order of those needed to support such (long duration) missions.” (Bagdigian et al., 2015-
094)  
II. The International Space Station (ISS) Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) 
The function of the ISS OGA is to convert potable water from the ISS Water Recovery System (WRS) into 
oxygen and hydrogen. The oxygen is sent to the crew cabin, and the hydrogen is either vented to space or used to 
produce more water.  
A. OGA description  
Figure 1 is a simplified schematic of the OGA taken from Takada et al., 2015-115.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Simplified OGA schematic. (Takada et al., 2015-115) 
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B. OGA Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs) 
The OGA uses the ISS maintenance and repair approach. Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs) are stored on board 
to replace failed units. The OGA ORUs are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs 
# ORU designation Full name  Description 
1 Hydrogen ORU Hydrogen Pressure dome  Electrolysis cell stack, Rotary Separator Accumulator, 
pressure dome 
2 Controller Process Controller Control and communication 
3 O2 ORU Oxygen Outlet  Removes water in oxygen output to cabin 
4 H2 Sensor ORU Hydrogen Sensor Measures hydrogen in oxygen output to cabin 
5 Pump ORU Pump Water and hydrogen loop recirculation pump 
6 Inlet DI Bed ORU Inlet DI Bed Feedwater iodine removal deionization bed 
7 Nitrogen Purge ORU Nitrogen Purge Purges system of hydrogen and oxygen 
8 PSM Power Supply Module Current to cell stack 
9 ACTEX Loop ACTEX Activated Carbon/Ion Exchange - recirculation loop 
deionization bed 
10 Water ORU Water Feed water flow control 
 
“Most of the OGA ORUs are run to failure except for the calibration life limited Hydrogen Sensor ORU and the 
mixed-resin containing ORUs (Inlet DI Bed and ACTEX) which are trended for water throughput and return water 
quality to determine the Preventative Maintenance (PM) replacement intervals.” (Takada, et al., 2015-115)  
III. The OGA analysis by Takada, Ghariani, and Van Keuren  
The paper by Takada, Ghariani, and Van Keuren summarizes the failure history, repairs, lessons learned, and the 
past and planned future redesign of the ISS OGA. (Takada et al., 2015-115)  
A. Overview of Takada et al., 2015-115 
The major sections of the paper by Takada et al. are: History of the ISS OGA, Description of the ISS OGA, 
Lessons Learned from ISS OGA, Requirements for a Long Duration Exploration Mission, Proposed Incremental 
Improvements, and Proposed Next Generation OGA Architecture.  
The Oxygen Generation System (OGS) was launched in July 2006 and the OGA was activated in July 2007. The 
accumulated OGA operating time in early 2015 was 33,392 hours, only 133 of which were on the ground before 
launch. The Lessons Learned from ISS OGA includes discussions of Cell Stack Failure in 2010, Hydrogen Sensor 
Drift, and Need for Day/Night Cycling. A historic timeline of major OGA events is provided. The Proposed 
Incremental Improvements that are justified in detail include Replacing the Cell Stack Membrane, Deleting the 
Nitrogen Purge Equipment, Replacing the Hydrogen Sensors with a Recombiner, Deleting the Wastewater Interface, 
Replacing the Hydrogen Dome with a Shroud, and Downsizing the Power Supply Module.  
B. Major OGA failure and maintenance events in Takada et al.   
Figures 5 and 6 of (Takada et al., 2015-115) show the timeline of all the significant OGA events, except that the 
scheduled Hydrogen Sensor ORU replacement is shown in Figure 7. (Takada et al., 2015-115). There are 35 non-H2 
sensor events in Figures 5 and 6 and eight H2 sensor ORU remove and replacements (R&Rs) in Figure 7. 
The failure events can be organized in groups. Five different event categories were identified by Takada et al. 
These groups are Loop filter dP issues, Low pH issues, High TOC events, H2 sensor, and Other. Fourteen new event 
groups can be identified. These new groups and their counts are AAA filter (4), ACTEX (4), Calibration (1), Cell 
stack (4), dP sensor (2), H2 sensor R&R (8), H2 sensor calibration (2), Limit exceed (3), Loop filters (6), Pressure 
test (2), Pump (1), Seal (1), TOC 1 (3), and TOC 2 (2). The new event groups were defined based on the five Takada 
et al. event categories and other information in Takada et al. All events are assigned to a group.  
1. Filter and Cell stack events 
The first group of Takada et al., Loop filter dP issues, corresponds to the new group of Filter. The OGA 
recirculating loop pressure increased, apparently because the filters were clogged, and the filters and the Water ORU 
were replaced, ultimately using new design filters. This problem apparently had the same cause as the second group 
of Takada failure events.  
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The second group of Takada et al., Low pH issues, corresponds to the new group of Cell stack. Initially low pH 
was noted in the OGA recirculating loop, and this produced corrosion products that clogged the loop filters. The 
apparent failure mechanism was as follows: the electrolysis cell membranes typically degrade, they produce acid 
and low pH, this caused corrosion that blocked the filters and contaminated the cell membranes, this increased their 
resistance, driving up the voltage to the shutdown limit. This problem was cured by adding the deionization bed into 
the loop to remove the acid and contaminants and by replacing the Hydrogen ORU.  
The two new failure groups, Filter and Cell stack, have the same cause, cell membrane degradation producing 
contaminants and acid. These two failure groups include 10 of the 43 failures. These all occurred during the first 20 
months of the 70 month record. The major failure event during OGA operations on ISS was the Cell stack failure. 
Initial attempts to treat the Loop dP symptom let to use of new filters. Finally, “a deionization bed was retrofitted in 
the recirculation loop in 2011.” (Takada, et al., 2015-115)  
This is a classic case of a high initial failure rate, often called “infant mortality.” A design oversight led to a 
cluster of common cause failures that could only be cured by a design modification. Takada et al. noted that, 
“Published literature for fuel cell technology identified that there is a known chemical degradation of the cell 
membrane polymer chain end groups during normal operation.” Ground testing before flight was limited. 
The third group of Takada et al., TOC, is split into two new groups, TOC 1 and TOC 2, spread in time. The 
fourth Takada et al. group, Other, is assigned into nine new groups.  
2. H2 sensor events 
H2 sensors R&R events were separately identified by Takada et al. and form a new event group. The H2 sensors 
are triple redundant. They had excessive drift that was accommodated by an operational procedure change. High 
sensor readings were tolerated in one of the three sensors. Because of this, H2 sensors R&R was not necessary at 
times other than at the scheduled intervals.  
Figure 2 plots the time averaged cumulative failure rate, N(t)/t, for all the failure and maintenance events. The 
event rates for the combined Filter and Cell stack group and for the H2 sensor group are also plotted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The time averaged cumulative failure and maintenance rate, N(t)/t, for all the events, for the combined 
Filter and Cell stack group, and for the H2 sensor group.  
 
After an initial increase nearly all due to the combined Filter and Cell stack event group, the overall cumulative 
average event rate remains constant at about 7 or 8 per year for the next four years. The H2 sensor R&R events 
occur at a constant rate, every 150 days, a little more than two per year.  
3. Events other than Filter and Cell stack and H2 sensor 
Figure 3 plots the number of failure and maintenance events each year for the combined Filter and Cell stack 
groups, 10 events, the H2 sensor group, 8 events, and all other failures and maintenance,11 groups with 25 events.  
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Figure 3. The number of failure and maintenance events each year without Filter and Cell stack and H2 sensor, 
for the combined Filter and Cell stack group, and for the H2 sensor group 
 
The early Filter and Cell stack problems were very significant and resulted in adding the Loop ACTEX ORU 
and replacing the Water ORU and Hydrogen ORU. After these OGA problems were corrected and the OGA restored 
to normal operation, other failure and maintenance events occurred at a declining rate. The H2 Sensor drift is a 
significant problem but did not result in unplanned maintenance. The OGA does not show the noticeable reliability 
growth or failure rate reduction that sometimes occurs when infant mortality is cured by discovering and repairing 
design errors.  
There are 25 events in the 11 groups other than Filter and Cell stack and H2 sensor R&R. The event groups, 
number in each group, and event description are shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Failure and maintenance events other than Filter and Cell stack and H2 sensor 
Event group # Event description 
ACTEX 4 Scrub, install, R&R 
Calibration 1 Recirculation loop temperature update 
dP sensor  2 Fails, drifts 
H2 sensor calibration 2 Calibration changed, related to H2 sensor problem 
Limit exceed 3 Different limits - loop pressure, feed water, gas  
Pressure test 2 Vent dome pressure test 
Pump 1 Pump ORU failed, possibly part of Loop filter and Cell stack problem 
Seal 1 Oxygen outlet seal taping 
TOC 1 3 TOC climbs due to feed water and drops 
TOC 2 2 TOC climbs due to feed water and drops after IX bed R&R 
 
Many of the events in Table 2 are related to the Filter and Cell stack and H2 sensor problems. The changes in H2 
sensor calibration are related to the H2 sensor drift problem. The Pump ORU replacement may be related to the 
Loop filter and Cell stack problem. The ACTEX was added to solve the Loop filter and Cell stack problem. Most of 
the other events are cleaning or sensor issues, but the twice occurring high TOC is a external cause of concern. The 
high rate of events reflects a need for repair, maintenance, and crew time that should be mitigated if possible.  
C. Planned OGA incremental improvements 
Many additional improvements to the OGA are suggested. “The proposed improvements include replacing the 
cell stack membrane material, deleting the nitrogen purge equipment, replacing the hydrogen sensors, deleting the 
wastewater interface, replacing the hydrogen dome, and redesigning the cell stack power supply. … Additionally, a 
redesigned system architecture will be proposed.” (Takada, et al., 2015-115) These incremental improvements are so 
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many that they approach a redesign, but the guiding concept is that the next generation OGA should be based on the 
original ISS OGA and not a clean sheet new design. The proposed improvements are listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Improvements proposed for the OSS OGA. 
# Change ORU Reason 
1 Cell stack membrane replacement Hydrogen The original cell stack membrane is no longer made. 
2 Delete the nitrogen purge equipment Nitrogen Purge 
Nitrogen purging may not be necessary. The nitrogen 
purge equipment weighs about 50 lbs.  
3 Replace hydrogen sensors H2 sensor The H2 sensors drift and have a calibration life of only 150 days. A hydrogen-oxygen recombiner is suggested.  
4 Delete the wastewater interface Water 
Diverting feed water with oxygen bubbles away from the 
cell stack may not be necessary.  
5 Replace the hydrogen dome Hydrogen Pressure dome 
It may be possible to use a removable shroud instead of a 
fixed dome.  
6 Downsize the PSM PSM A lower oxygen requirement would allow the PSM to be downsized.  
7 Loop water refresh Refresh (new) Allow reducing high TOC. 
8 Disable Independent Shutdown Monitor Controller For troubleshooting and workarounds. 
9 Relocate filters Most Embedded filters require replacement of an entire ORU. 
10 Add thermal expansion capability and flex hoses Most 
Now thermal expansion devices must be used during 
maintenance. 
11 Disable fluid connect keying  Keying prevents flexible response to contingencies.  
 
These changes are described further in (Takada, et al., 2015-115). The second through seventh improvements are 
major changes in the ISS OGA system design concept. The last four changes are intended to reduce repair, 
maintenance, and crew time and would apply to any similar liquid handling space system.  
IV. Proposed next generation OGA architecture 
Table 4 indicates which of the OGA ORUs are proposed to be added, deleted, or redesigned. 
 
Table. 4. OGA ORUs to be added, deleted, or redesigned. 
# ORU designation Change 
1 Hydrogen ORU Shroud instead of dome, new membrane 
2 Controller New sensors and control, disable ISM 
3 O2 ORU  
4 H2 Sensor ORU O2-H2 recombiner instead of sensor  
5 Pump ORU  
6 Inlet DI Bed ORU  
7 Nitrogen Purge ORU Deleted 
8 PSM Downsize to half power 
9 ACTEX Added after ISS failure 
10 Water ORU Delete wastewater interface 
11 Water refresh ORU New 
 
The OGA originally had nine ORUs and is proposed to have ten. The ACTEX was added after the ISS Cell stack 
failure. A new Water refresh ORU is proposed. The Nitrogen Purge ORU is planned to be deleted. Table 4 shows 
that all but three of the eleven listed ORUs will be significantly changed in the proposed next generation OGA 
architecture. The proposed future OGA schematic is much simpler than the current one. Figure 4 is the proposed 
schematic of a future OGA taken from Takada et al.  
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Figure 4. Proposed schematic of a future OGA. (Takada et al., 2015-115) 
V. Advancing the OGA for ISS and for future long duration missions 
The proposed development of the OGA by Takada et al. will be considered with regard to two very important 
OGA objectives that should be distinguished. The first objective is to improve the ISS OGA for better performance 
and easier maintenance on the ISS. The second is to advance the ISS OGA baseline design for use on a future long 
duration mission.  
A. Improving the ISS OGA for use on ISS 
Clearly the lessons learned from operating the ISS OGA have provided deep engineering knowledge and 
important practical suggestions for improving performance, reducing crew maintenance time, improving reliability, 
and reducing resupply mass from Earth. Some of the suggested improvements can be easily implemented on ISS, 
such as deleting the nitrogen purge and the wastewater interface. Other improvements would be implemented in new 
operational hardware or spares.  
B. Improving the ISS OGA for use on a future long duration mission 
While the improvements of the ISS OGA in system complexity, mass, reliability, maintenance, and resupply will 
be very useful for future missions, these future missions will have new challenges in addition to those of ISS. The 
paper by Takada et al. points out that the proposed improved future OGA will be much better suited for a future long 
duration mission. It will increase reliability and reduce the costs, system weight, crew maintenance time, and 
resupply mass. “Future deep space long duration missions will not likely have logistics resupply capability from 
Earth to provide spare ORUs. Therefore, it will become important to allow the crew flexibility to access and repair 
internal components of complex ORUs.” (Takada et al., 2015-115) The use of filters will be minimized. Filters will 
be located to be easily inspected, replaced, or cleaned. The hydrogen dome will be replaced by a shroud for easier 
access and repair of internal components.  
Takada et al. mention that, “The general requirements for a future long duration exploration mission will likely 
be different from those that influenced the ISS OGA design.” They consider two specific different requirements, the 
oxygen production rate and the procedures for safe management of hydrogen and oxygen. Fewer crew and the 
expected continuous power availability on a future mission will allow the oxygen production rate to be reduced by 
more than half. Some specific systems and procedures established to ensure safe management of hydrogen and 
oxygen are proposed to be eliminated in future systems. These include the hydrogen dome, the nitrogen purge, and 
the wastewater interface. “Over the many years of operating the ISS OGA, valuable experience and understanding 
has been gained relating to the safe management of hydrogen and oxygen. Through careful analysis and testing, 
some of the conservatism in the design can be reduced without adding appreciable risk.” (Takada et al., 2015-115)  
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C. Problems using or adapting the ISS OGA for future missions 
Past discussions of Mars missions have usually assumed that the life support systems will be similar to ISS but 
redesigned as needed for the new mission. System developers tend to prefer a fresh start. There have been extensive 
long term efforts to develop life support systems that improve on ISS for future missions. Being able to use a system 
very similar to the ISS OGA for exploration missions and Mars would maximize the use of ISS experience and 
could save time and money, but there are many problems on this path.  
1. The ISS OGA has current problems 
Failure and maintenance events continue to occur and maintenance require spare ORUs and  crew time.  
2. The ISS OGA has extensive planned redesign 
The need to correct problems and make improvements has led to proposing significant redesign. Changes that 
cure one problem may create additional problems. The suggested changes in the planned future ISS OGA are so 
extensive that it seems reasonable to also consider a similar clean sheet design.  
3. The ISS OGA requirements differ from the Mars OGA requirements 
There are many similarities between ISS and Mars OGA requirements, so the designs will be similar. There are 
also some important differences, so the optimum designs will probably differ.  
The major difference is that life support in deep space must be considerably more reliable than on ISS, where 
emergency resupply or quick return are possible. Another related problem noted by Takada et al. is that the ORU 
maintenance approach is unsuitable for deep space with ORU's as large and complex as those now provided for ISS. 
Takada et al. suggest removing the hydrogen dome to facilitate component repair, however they do not specifically 
analyze reliability or develop a deep space repair and maintenance concept. Takada et al. also note the different 
lower quantity of oxygen required. A Mars transit OGA would also require the ability for quiescent waiting in Mars 
orbit and hardening for deep space radiation. A Mars surface OGA would be able to take advantage of Mars gravity 
and possibly depend on oxygen obtained from the Mars atmosphere. (Jones et al., 2014-074)  
4. The ISS OGA is designed for ISS not Mars 
A real hardware system such as the ISS OGA cannot be optimized for two different missions with different 
requirements at the same time. This problem is most strongly demonstrated by the different levels of OGA reliability 
thought to be needed for crew safety. Both the ISS and Mars OGAs must not endanger the crew. The ISS OGA 
poses little risk to the crew even with the current failure and maintenance events, for several important reasons. The 
large volume of the ISS and the oxygen storage tanks provide a large oxygen buffer. The Russian life support 
system includes an alternate OGA. OGA ORUs are stored onboard and if used can be resupplied fairly quickly. If an 
OGA failure leads to an oxygen emergency, the crew can immediately return to Earth. 
Because a Mars mission cannot be easily resupplied, and because a Mars crew cannot return ahead of a schedule 
determined by planetary orbits, it is usually understood that a Mars life support system should have much higher 
reliability, maintainability, and reparability than a system on ISS. The level of reliability required for Mars will 
depend on the overall design for crew safety, which could include abort options, stored supplies, and backup 
systems.  
Although reliability was important in technology selection, the ISS ECLSS was not designed for unnecessarily 
high reliability. New valves were selected for low mass rather than heavier ones with demonstrated reliability. 
Integrated systems such as the OGA were tested only briefly before launch, rather than having their life 
demonstrated. Since high reliability was not the priority in ISS OGA design, it seems that its reliability can be 
improved relatively easily. The reliability approach should be coupled with a new deep space repair and 
maintenance concept that replaces the ISS ORU approach.  
5. The future ISS OGA will have fewer safety systems 
The hydrogen dome, the nitrogen purge, and the wastewater interface that were provided to ensure the safe 
management of hydrogen and oxygen seem excessive and will be removed. This will reduce system mass, 
complexity and logistics resupply. It is difficult to determine how much safety is required, how safe a system is, and 
what safety improvements are more cost-effective. But we need more safety for Mars than for ISS, not less.  
Experience and the understanding it provides are very useful, but they are poor guides in assessing the 
probability of accidents that have not recently occurred. The three Russian Elektron oxygen generators on board ISS 
were “plagued with problems” in the mid 2000’s. (Wikipedia, ISS ECLSS) NASA’s tragic experience with 
Challenger should remind us that it is easy to mistakenly assume that things that are going well will continue to go 
well. We cannot be certain that the current ISS OGA, even with all its safety systems, will not have any problems.  
Funding, developing, testing, and flying the future OGA proposed by Takada et al. would be very worthwhile. 
The Mars OGA could easily differ from the ISS OGA. The design of the OGA for Mars should be based on 
extensive risk, hazard, and safety analysis. 
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D. Overall systems engineering and management guidance is lacking 
Takada et al. provide excellent understanding of the OGA hardware, its history, and its needed improvements. 
They have begun to take a conservative, sound approach to advancing the OGA for future exploration missions. But 
more needs to be done. Standard NASA systems engineering and development project planning would include 
requirements definition, alternate concept development, and trade-offs based on analysis of performance, cost, risk, 
reliability, maintainability, etc. Even in the rare case where an off-the-shelf, flight proven solution is available, the 
systems engineering process should be used to ensure it is best.  
Engineers appropriately focus on the important technical details involved in developing and improving the 
performance of their hardware. Nothing is more necessary, but advancing technology beyond the development 
laboratory also depends on a myriad of systems factors. Development engineers directly feel the usual unwelcome 
constraints on mass, volume, power, current budget, and schedule. They may postpone or even omit considering 
maintainability, operability, reliability, and overall cost unless reminded of overall mission requirements by systems 
engineering or management. The next paper to be reviewed provides an overview perspective on advancing the 
OGA for a long duration mission.  
VI. The OGA analysis by Bagdigian, Dake, Gentry, and Gault  
The paper by Bagdigian, Dake, Gentry, and Gault titled, “International Space Station Environmental Control and 
Life Support System Mass and Crewtime Utilization In Comparison to a Long Duration Human Space Exploration 
Mission,” considers the question “(H)ow well suited is the ISS ECLSS suite of technologies to meeting the needs of 
future missions?” The paper surveys the maintenance history of the ISS Water Recovery System and the OGA. The 
equipment mass used and the achieved hardware operating lifetimes were determined to help assess cost and 
reliability for a Mars mission. (Bagdigian et al., 2015-094)  
A. Overview of Bagdigian et al., 2015-094 
The paper by Bagdigian et al. describes Mars Design Reference Architecture 5.0, the ISS maintenance data that 
is tracked at the ORU level, the ISS Water Recovery System, and the ISS OGA. The sections on the Water Recovery 
System and the OGA include schematics, descriptions of operation, a figure on the life cycle system mass used and 
material produced, a figure on the maintenance events and crew time used, and figures comparing the OGA 
operating life history to a 1,000 day mission duration target. 
B. The OGA removal and replacement and maintenance events from Bagdigian et al.  
Bagdigian et al.’s figure 10 shows the life cycle system mass used for the OGA and oxygen produced, and it 
tracks the timeline of the ORU Remove and Replace (R&R) events that increase the total OGA mass utilized. Their 
figure 11 shows the OGA maintenance events and accumulates the crew time used. (Bagdigian et al., 2015-094)  
1. The OGA removal and replacement events from Bagdigian et al.  
Bagdigian et al.’s figure 10 tracks the increasing mass utilized to keep the OGA operating. The only events are 
R&R, Remove and Replace. There are 20 H2 Sensor replacements, 8 ACTEX replacements, 2 FSE replacements, 
and one each of Water (H2O) ORU, Pump ORU, and H2 ORU, replacements. There are 33 total R&Rs. Figure 5 
plots the number of OGA Repair and Replace (R&R) events each year for the H2 sensors, 20 events, the ACTEX, 8 
events, and other R&R, 5 events.  
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Figure 5. The number of OGA Repair and Replace (R&R) events each year for the H2 sensors, the ACTEX, and 
other R&R.  
 
The H2 Sensor and ACTEX replacements occur at roughly constant rates of about two each per year. The 
average total R&R rate in later years is about four per year. The five R&R events other than H2 Sensor and ACTEX 
replacements are the H2O ORU, Pump ORU, H2 ORU, and two FSE ORU replacements. These are all associated 
with the Cell stack failure events in 2009 and 2010.  
2. The OGA maintenance events from Bagdigian et al.  
Bagdigian et al.’s figure 11 shows all the OGA maintenance events and sums up the crew time used. There are 
41 R&Rs, 8 more than shown in their earlier figure 10. These form a cluster associated with the Cell stack failure 
events in mid 2010.  
In addition to the 41 R&Rs, there are 36 other maintenance events, for a total of 77. There are ten incidents of 
cleaning the AAA, not really an OGA event,, four cases of taking recirculating loop water samples classified as 
inspection, two incidents of removing and reinstalling modified jumpers, four repairs including the H2O ORU filter 
and recirculating loop flush, and sixteen cases of troubleshooting, which were about half taking water samples with 
the rest associated with the ACTEX, Pump ORU, and Water ORU. The total of 77 maintenance events are about 
80% more than the 43 major events that were identified by Takada et al.  
Figure 6 plots the number of OGA maintenance events each year for the H2 sensors R&R, 20 events, ACTEX 
R&R, 8 events, other repair and replacements, 19 events, cleaning, 10 events, troubleshooting 16 events, and H2O 
sampling, 4 events.  
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Figure 6. The number of OGA maintenance events each year.  
 
The other replacement events occurred in 2009 and 2010 and were associated with the Cell stack failure. The 
troubleshooting occurred from 2009 to 2012. The event data shows a major problem being discovered, analyzed, and 
solved, followed by routine maintenance. All but one event in 2012 or later years is either H2 sensor replacement, 
ACTEX replacement, cleaning, or water sampling.  
C. The ISS OGA would not save mass or cost on a Mars transit mission 
The benefit of recycling is often measured by the breakeven date, which is the time required for the mass of the 
recycling system to be paid for by the mass of materials saved by recycling. This preliminary comparison is not a 
comparison of oxygen storage and recycling, since the mass of the oxygen tanks is not included. Bagdigian et al.’s 
figure 10 is a mass breakeven chart that shows the total launch mass actually used to support the OGA and the mass 
of the oxygen produced over time. It shows the sequence of the 33 ORU Remove and Replace (R&R) events that 
add to the total OGA mass utilized.  
The ISS is a very long duration mission, possibly extending 20 or more years. The ISS OGA can easily pay back 
its launch mass with the mass of oxygen it provides. Mars missions are much shorter, less than three years total. 
Typical conjunction class Mars missions have outbound and return transit times of 200 to 250 days each and Mars 
surface stays of 400 to 550 days. (Boden and Hoffman, 2000) The total transit time that the OGA operates is 400 to 
500 days, interrupted by a quiescent period of 400 to 550 days if all the crew is on the surface. An improved ISS 
OGA could be a candidate for Mars transit but less applicable for Mars surface, where gravity and surface resources 
are complicating factors.  
1. Mass utilized pay back for the ISS OGA on ISS and in transit to Mars 
Bagdigian et al.’s figure 10 has a time axis extending from July 2007 to March 2015, 7.75 years. During that 
time 2,077 pounds of OGA hardware has been utilized and 8,369 pounds of oxygen produced, so the mass of the 
oxygen is 4.03 times the mass of the OGA hardware used. The time required for oxygen production mass to pay 
back the OGA launch mass was 7.75/4.03 = 1.92 years, 702 days. Since Mars round trip transits are shorter than 702 
days, this ISS OGA performance would not save mass on a Mars mission.  
The ISS OGA produced oxygen at a higher rate after July 2011. About 6,400 pounds of oxygen was produced 
from July 2011 to March 2015, 3.75 years. This mass of the oxygen is 3.08 times the mass of the OGA hardware 
used. In this later interval, the time required for oxygen production mass to pay back OGA launch mass would be 
3.75/3.08 = 1.22 years, 444 days. This launch mass breakeven date is roughly equal to the 450 day average Mars 
round trip transit time. Even this better ISS OGA performance would not save mass on a Mars transit.  
2. OGA system and spares mass pay back on ISS and in transit to Mars 
The mass counted in Bagdigian et al.’s figure 10 is the launch mass actually utilized to keep the OGA operating. 
It does not include the mass of the spares that are launched to ISS and kept on hand to ensure high reliability. Most 
of the spares now on ISS will never be used, since they required only to insure against failures with low probability. 
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Suppose an ORU has a low 2% chance of failure over the mission duration, but higher reliability is needed. A spare 
must be provided, but the chance of actually using the spare is only 2%. The spare mass is mostly not utilized, but a 
complete account of the mass required to support the system would include all the required onboard spares.  
The OGA ORU spares on board ISS and that might be taken on a transit to Mars are shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. OGA ORU spares on ISS and for Mars transit. 
# ORU designation Full name Onboard spares for ISS Onboard spares for Mars transit 
1 Hydrogen ORU Hydrogen Pressure dome  1 3 
2 Controller Process Controller 2 3 
3 O2 ORU Oxygen Outlet  1 3 
4 H2 Sensor ORU Hydrogen Sensor 2 3 
5 Pump ORU Pump 2 3 
6 Inlet DI Bed ORU Inlet DI Bed 1 3 
7 Nitrogen Purge ORU Nitrogen Purge 1 3 
8 PSM Power Supply Module 2 3 
9 ACTEX Loop ACTEX 0 3 
10 Water ORU Water 1 3 
 
The number of onboard spares for ISS was taken from the ISS Vehicle Office’s Maintenance Data Collection 
(ISS MDC, 09/04/15). Bagdigian et al.’s figure 10 gives mass of the OGA and the aggregated ORUs. The OGS 
system mass is 1,487 lb, and the process ORUs, tank ORU’s, and controller ORUs are 59% of that total, 877 lbs. 
Assuming that the ISS OGA has one spare of each of the ORUs, instead of the exact number of spares in Table 5, 
the total mass of the original system, the additional ORUs utilized, and the onboard spares would be 2,964 lbs. For 
the actual ISS oxygen production rate of 5.15 lb/day, the time required for the oxygen production to pay back the 
OGA, used ORU, and spares mass would be 2,964 lbs/5.15 lb/day = 576 days.  
Since much higher reliability is required for Mars transit, three spares of each ORU are usually allocated for 
Mars. (Connolly, 2000) The total mass of the original system plus three sets of onboard spare ORUs would be 4,119 
lbs. For the oxygen production rate of 5.15 lb/day, the time required for the oxygen production to pay back OGA 
and triple spares mass would be 4,118 lb/5.15 lb/day = 800 days.  
3. OGA system and spares mass pay back for higher oxygen production in transit to Mars 
Bagdigian et al. note that the ISS OGA oxygen production of 5.15.lb/day supports only about 2.9 crew. Takada 
et al. note that the Mars crew would probably be 4, and that the ISS OGA was designed to produce up to 20.4 lb of 
oxygen per day for 6 crew plus animals. If 5.15 lb /day of oxygen supports 2.9 crew, 4 crew would require 7.1 
lb/day. For this oxygen production rate of 7.1 lb/day, the time required for the oxygen production to pay back the 
OGA and triple spares mass would be 4,118/7.1 = 580 days, longer than the longest there and back Mars transit 
time. The breakeven date of 580 days seems realistic. It assumes that the initial system is used with three sets of 
spares to support 4 crew. It is longer than the longest expected total transit time to Mars and back, 500 days.  
4. Supplying the oxygen would be cheaper than using the OGA for ISS, and much cheaper for Mars transit  
Bagdigian et al.’s figure 10 and the breakeven date computations based on the data in that figure show that the 
ISS OGA would weigh less than the oxygen produced on shorter missions such as the Mars transit. Other 
investigations have shown that oxygen generation does not always save launch mass or Equivalent System Mass 
(ESM) for similar missions. (Do, et al., 2015-289) (Lange and Anderson, 2012-3491)  
If oxygen generation does not save launch mass, it would not save launch cost. However, the launch cost is only 
one of the costs of providing a recycling system. The Life Cycle Cost (LCC) adds the design, development, and test 
cost, and the operations cost, to the launch cost. The recycling system design, development, and test cost can be 
significantly larger than the launch cost. The operations cost can be 10% of the design, development, and test cost 
for each year of operations.  
Oxygen recycling systems are much more expensive to develop and operate per kilogram than oxygen in tanks. 
The LCC per kilogram of a recycling system can be more than 10 times greater than the LCC per kilogram of 
resupplied material and tanks. (Jones, 2015-295) This means that the LCC breakeven date for Mars transit recycling 
could be ten times longer than the oxygen mass breakeven date, 10 to 20 years rather than 1 or 2 years. 
On ISS, over 7.75, the 2,077 pounds of OGA hardware that has been utilized has produced 8,369 pounds of 
oxygen, so the mass of the oxygen is 4.03 times the mass of the OGA hardware used. But if each pound of OGA 
hardware cost as much to provide as 10 pounds of supplied oxygen, the recycling cost to direct supply cost ratio 
would be 2,077*10/8,369 = 2.4. Recycling oxygen has cost roughly twice as much as directly supplying it would 
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have been. ISS oxygen recycling is necessary since launching all the crew’s oxygen is not now possible, but 
recycling ISS oxygen does not appear to have saved cost compared to directly supplying it. The ISS OGA could 
have produced more oxygen if needed would then have had a greater payback.  
D. OGA operating lifetimes, reliability, and spares requirement 
Bagdigian et al. investigate the OGS ORU reliability by comparing the expected or achieved hardware operating 
life to a target 1000-day mission length. The OGA ORU predicted and achieved operating lives are shown in their 
figures 12 through 15. The predicted life is based on calculated Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF), design life, 
calibration life, estimated limited life, or planned preventive maintenance. All of the OGS ORUs have achieved 
operating lives on the ISS that meet the 1000-day mission target life with the exception of the H2 Sensor ORU. A 
demonstrated operating life longer than the Mars transit duration does not mean that a single OGA with no spare 
ORUs would be a reasonable design. The ISS now carries one or two spares of each OGA ORU. How many of 
spares each ORU would be needed for Mars? That can be estimated from the ORU MTBFs.  
1. OGA ORU predicted and operating lifetimes  
Table 6 gives the predicted and observed operating lifetimes from Bagdigian et al. The predicted life and the 
basis of prediction are given. The number (#) of units operated on the ISS is given along with their proven operating 
lifetimes. The last column is an estimated MTBF, based on the predicted and observed life times.  
 
Table 6. OGA ORU predicted and proven lifetimes and estimated MTBFs. 
# ORU 
designation 
Full name Basis for life 
prediction 
Predicted 
life, hours 
# Proven life Estimated 
MTBF 
1 Hydrogen 
ORU 
Hydrogen 
Pressure dome  MTBF 29,500 
2 26,000, 
>44,000 35,000 
2 Controller Process 
Controller MTBF > 70,000 
1 >70,000 70,000 
3 O2 ORU Oxygen Outlet  Design life 87,600 1 >70,000 70,000 
4 H2 Sensor 
ORU 
Hydrogen Sensor Calibration life 3,600  (150 days) 
18 4 < 500, 14 = 
3,600 2,600 
5 Pump ORU Pump Limited life 17,500 2 25,000, >45,000 35,000 
6 Inlet DI Bed 
ORU 
Inlet DI Bed Preventative 
maintenance 
43,800  
(5 years) 
1 >70,000 70,000 
7 Nitrogen Purge 
ORU 
Nitrogen Purge Design life 87,600 1 >70,000 70,000 
8 PSM Power Supply 
Module   
   
9 ACTEX ACTEX -
Recirculation Preventative maintenance 
13,140  
(1.5 years) 
3 5,500, 
16,000, 
12,000 
11,000 
10 ACTEX ACTEX –By-
Pass Preventative maintenance 
13,140  
(1.5 years) 
3 21,000, 
16,000, 
25,000 
20,000 
11 Water ORU Water MTBF 37,800 2 23,000, 52,000 38,000 
 
The predicted and most of the proven life data are from Bagdigian et al.’s figures 12 through 15. These figures 
have a time span of about 27,000 hours, about three years, and many ORUs have operated longer. Figure 10 shows 
when ORUs were replaced and allows the current operating lives to be estimated. The hydrogen ORU was replaced 
in mid-2010, the water ORU in mid-2009, and the pump ORU in early 2010. The controller, oxygen outlet ORU, 
inlet DI bed, and nitrogen purge have operated for eight years without replacement.  
In cases where all the ISS OGA ORUs have reached the end of life, the estimated MTBF is the average lifetime. 
In cases where one unit has operated without failure for eight years, the MTBF is estimated as eight years, 70,000 
hours. If equipment has operated for a time T with no failures, this suggests that the probability of failure was less 
than one-half. So the MTBF can be estimated as roughly T. If the MTBF was much less, we would have seen many 
failures. It could be much longer, but longer testing would be needed to show that. We should not optimistically 
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assume the MTBF is much longer than the successful test time. In cases where one unit has failed but its 
replacement continues to operate, the MTBF is estimated as the average of the two observed lifetimes. Since the two 
units that failed and were replaced, the Hydrogen and Pump ORUs, both failed due to the membrane degradation 
problem since fixed by the ACTEX redesign, it can be argued that they should have higher MTBFs. Since this is not 
demonstrated, we use the actual data.  
2. Using MTBFs for reliability calculations 
The MTBF has a useful direct meaning. Half the ORUs are expected to fail by the MTBF. If the MTBF is equal 
to the mission length and we have only one system with no spare, the probability of failure during the mission is 
50%. If we have a system and a spare, the probability both fail is 0.5 * 0.5 = 0.25, 25 %. To get an overall 
probability of failure of 1%, 0.01, we need 0.5
N
 = 0.01, and N = 6 or 7 units.  
If equipment has a certain MTBF, its failure rate is f = 1/MTBF. We need the MTBF to be much, much greater 
than the mission length, L, to have a single unit provide a low probability of failure. For F = f * L = L/MTBF = 0.01, 
the MTBF = 100 L. The MTBF must be 100 times the mission length for a single unit without spares to have a 1% 
probability of failure. If MTBF = 10 L, F = 0.1 and we need two redundant units to achieve F
2
 = 0.01. If MTBF = 5 
L, F = 0.2 and we need three redundant units for F
3
 = 0.008. This means that, to prove a very low probability of 
failure for a single unit over the mission length, it would have to be operated without failure for many times the 
mission length.  
3. OGA ORU estimated MTBFs, failure rates, and spares 
Table 7 gives the OGA ORU estimated MTBFs, failure rates, and estimated spares 
 
Table 7. OGA ORU estimated MTBFs, failure rates, and estimated spares. 
# ORU designation Full name 
Estimat-
ed 
MTBF 
ORU failure 
probability 
ISS 
spares 
ISS failure 
probability 
Needed 
redundancy 
Redundant 
failure 
probability 
1 Hydrogen ORU 
Hydrogen 
Pressure dome 35,000 0.31 1 0.095 5 0.0028 
2 Controller Process Controller 70,000 0.15 2 0.004 4 0.0006 
3 O2 ORU Oxygen Outlet 70,000 0.15 1 0.024 4 0.0006 
4 Pump ORU Pump 35,000 0.31 2 0.029 5 0.0028 
5 Inlet DI Bed ORU Inlet DI Bed 70,000 0.15 1 0.024 4 0.0006 
6 Nitrogen Purge ORU Nitrogen Purge 70,000 0.15 1 0.024 4 0.0006 
7 PSM Power Supply Module     2       
8 ACTEX ACTEX -Recirculation 11,000   0       
9 ACTEX ACTEX –By-Pass 20,000   0       
10 Water ORU Water 38,000 0.28 1 0.081 5 0.0019 
       Totals 1.52   0.280   0.0097 
 
The probability that an ORU will fail over a mission length L is L/MTBF. For the Mars transit, out and back, the 
mission length L = 450 days, 10,800 hours. The mission failure probability for each ORU is 10,800/MTBF. The 
failure probability for each ORU is listed. The H2 Sensor is not included, as it is an identified scheduled replacement 
ORU and may be replaced in a future design. The ACTEX is also a scheduled replacement unit and is not included 
in the reliability calculations. 
The ORU failure probability is summarized for a single string OGA, but the total of 1.52 exceeds a probability of 
one and is meaningless. [The failure probabilities for ORUs that all must work together can be added, but only if the 
failure probabilities are small. For high failure rates, the reliability of the ORUs must be multiplied. Suppose the 
failure probabilities of two series units are each 0.6. The reliabilities are 1 - 0.6 = 0.4, the series reliability that both 
work is 0.4*0.4 = 0.16, and the failure probability is 0.84, not 0.6 + 0.6 = 1.2.]  
All the ORUs except the ACTEX have spares on ISS. The number of ISS spares is shown. One spare gives dual 
redundancy, two spares give triple redundancy. The probability of not having a needed spare on board ISS would be 
0.28, 28%, if it was not possible to replace spares that were used. 
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We need much higher reliability for the OGA on a Mars transit. Suppose the required reliability is 0.01, 1%. The 
chance of not having a needed spare must be less than 1%. We need three or four spares, quadruple or quintuple 
redundancy of the ORUs for less than 1% probability of not having a needed spare. If all ORUs havd only three 
spares, the probability of not having one when needed would increase to 2%. 
A simpler direct calculation can check the math. Assume that the OGA has seven ORUs of concern, as above, 
each with MTBF = 70,000 hours. Assume that the OGA is required to have less than a 1% probability of failure over 
the mission length of 450 days, 10,800 hours. The probability that an ORU with MTBF = 70,000 hours will fail over 
10,800 hours is 0.15, or 15%. (10,800/70,000 = 0.15) Suppose each ORU has the number N of redundant units. The 
overall failure probability is 7 * (0.15)
N
 = 0.01. N, the number of redundant units of each ORU, must be 4. This is as 
expected since the ORUs with MTBF = 70,000 hours required quadruple redundancy.  
To be able to use less redundancy, we need a longer MTBF. For a longer MTBF, we need longer successful test 
times. Simply because the Hydrogen, Pump, and Water ORUs failed once during the mission, their MTBFs are cut 
in half, their failure probabilities are doubled, and they require an additional spare. For accurate measurement of 
MTBF, we need to test several units for much longer than the mission, preferably until failure.  
4. Assuming that all failures can be repaired using spares is optimistic 
The above analysis is standard reliability analysis. It is best case, assuming a good, well-tested design, and that 
all failures can be repaired using spares. But redundancy can be defeated by design errors, external impacts, 
manufacturing errors, and other kinds of common cause failures. The ISS OGA has had design problems that 
required redesign. Design errors cannot be repaired using spares on the way to Mars. Relying on standard reliability 
analysis and assuming that all failures can be repaired using spares is extremely over optimistic. Simple reliability is 
useful as a best case analysis, since it can identify reliability problems and the need for spares. But providing the 
estimated spares does not guarantee success. The ISS OGS has limited testing and a high requirement for spares. 
The previous discussion of launch mass payback assumed that the OGA would need three spares of each ORU. The 
analysis here suggests three or four spares are needed, including the large Hydrogen ORU. The high mass of the 
spares means that the ISS OGA will probably not save mass over direct supply of oxygen on the way to Mars. And 
if the OGA does not save mass, it certainly will not save cost.  
VII. Potential issues in improving the ISS OGA for Mars transit 
The review of the papers on the ISS OGA by Takada et al. and Bagdigian et al. has found many potential issues 
that must be solved in developing the ISS OGA for Mars transit.  
A. Table of potential issues 
The potential issues are given in Table 8, in the order discussed above.  
 
Table 8 Potential issues in developing the ISS OGA for Mars transit.  
# Issue 
1 The ISS OGA has reliability and maintenance issues 
2 The ISS OGA has extensive planned redesign 
3 The ISS OGA requirements differ from the Mars OGA requirements 
4 The ISS OGA ORU maintenance is designed for ISS, not Mars 
5 The future ISS OGA will have fewer safety systems 
6 NASA project planning and systems engineering is to be done 
7 The ISS OGA would not save substantial launch mass  
8 The ISS OGA would not save cost  
9 The ISS OGA has insufficient demonstrated reliability 
B. Discussion of potential issues 
Each potential issue is discussed above and commented on here. 
1. The ISS OGA has reliability and maintenance issues 
The ISS OGA has been operating safely and reliably. The reviewed papers are concerned with reducing the 
current ISS OGA demand for spares logistics and crew time for preventive maintenance and failure repair. Given the 
ability to resupply the ISS relatively easily and quickly compared to a Mars mission, an ISS OGA failure would 
probably not cause a threat to the crew. The concern for Mars transit is whether a system similar to the ISS OGA in 
design and development can be kept working using the available on-board spares and crew time.  
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2. The ISS OGA has extensive planned redesign 
Many improvements have been planned for the ISS OGA, including replacing the cell stack membrane material, 
deleting the nitrogen purge equipment, replacing the hydrogen sensors, deleting the wastewater interface, replacing 
the hydrogen dome, adding loop water refresh, and redesigning the cell stack power supply. The system architecture 
and schematic are significantly different. One motivation is to reduce spares and crew time. Any redesign made to 
cure design issues is likely to introduce new problems that will only be discovered during further operation. Design 
errors cannot be corrected with spare parts and crew time. 
3. The ISS OGA requirements differ from the Mars OGA requirements 
The OGA for Mars should have lower mass, better reliability and maintainability, greater safety, radiation 
hardening, and capability for quiescent operation. In general, a system designed for one application and set of 
requirements is very unlikely to be optimum for a different application and set of requirements.  
4. The ISS OGA is designed for ISS not Mars 
The ORU maintenance approach developed for ISS is workable but not trouble free even for ISS. The ORU 
approach seems very unsuitable for deep space, and lower level repair is often suggested. The details of lower level 
repair have not been worked out and implementing a new maintenance approach in existing hardware seems 
infeasible.  
5. The future ISS OGA will have fewer safety systems 
It is planned to remove the hydrogen dome, the nitrogen purge, and the wastewater interface that were provided 
to ensure the safe management of hydrogen and oxygen. The justification seems to be that, if it hasn’t failed lately, a 
an over conservative approach and unnecessary equipment were used to make it safe. But a more conservative, not 
less conservative approach seems needed for Mars.  
6. NASA project planning and systems engineering remains to be done 
In considering using the ISS OGA for Mars, the usual NASA project planning and systems engineering is 
noticeably not being done. Where are the requirements definition, alternate concept development, and trade-offs? 
Where is reliability, risk, hazard, and safety analysis? Instead of life cycle cost, we have hardware mass compared to 
the mass of oxygen produced. Instead of elementary reliability analysis, we have a demonstration that some ORUs 
have operated longer than the mission length. These are not the standard NASA systems engineering methods.  
7. The ISS OGA would not save substantial launch mass  
The ISS OGA with triple spares for Mars would have somewhat higher mass that the oxygen it would produce 
on a Mars transit. This single fact alone suggests that using the ISS OGA for Mars is questionable. A much better 
oxygen generation system is needed to avoid the low technology, brute force approach of supplying the oxygen in 
tanks.  
8. The ISS OGA would not save cost  
Using launch mass rather than cost to evaluate recycling is traditional in life support. This favors recycling over 
direct supply, since recycling saves mass but recycling equipment has much higher development and operating cost 
per kilogram than material in tanks. Unless recycling has a significant launch mass advantage over direct supply, it 
would not save cost. This suggests that the ISS OGA may not have saved cost for ISS.  
9. The ISS OGA has insufficient demonstrated reliability 
The testing of the OGA ORUs has been largely done on ISS. The original ORUs have been operating over eight 
years. Even if all the ORUs had operated without failure, the demonstrated reliability would be so low that triple 
spares are needed for 1% probability of failure during Mars transit. The high OGA mass and the need for triple 
spares make the ISS OGA uneconomical for Mars transit. The possibility of undetected or newly introduced design 
errors and other unanticipated challenges make it risky to rely on on-board spares and crew maintenance to keep the 
ISS OGA operating on the journey to Mars. 
VIII. Overview and possible future work 
The review of the two papers on improving the ISS OGA for Mars transit has interesting implications for future 
work. 
A. Rethink the initial assumption that ISS life support can be refined for use in Mars transit 
Takada et al. suggested that the “proposed incremental improvements” would allow the ISS OGA to be used on a 
future deep space long duration mission. However, their suggested changes amount to an extensive redesign rather 
than incremental improvements. Bagdigian et al. ask if the ISS OGA can support a Mars mission. The ISS mass 
savings and operating lifetimes that they present show that a system similar to the ISS OGA would not save 
significant mass on a Mars transit mission.  
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The optimistic assumption that the ISS life support can be improved and used for deep space and Mars is widely 
shared. “Oxygen generation systems and water recycling systems on the International Space Station today will 
continue to be refined for deep space travel.” (Bolden, September 17, 2015) Unfortunately, the data provided by 
Takada et al. and Bagdigian et al. in the reviewed papers do not support the idea that ISS life support is nearly 
suitable for Mars. Developing life support for Mars will require a more extensive effort.  
The OGS pays for its launch mass much more slowly than other life support systems. The water recycling 
system especially pays for itself in launch mass much more quickly. It is a much better recycling technology to use 
in Mars transit. A further investigation examines the mass payback of the other ISS life support systems and finds 
that their material mass payback is higher, but is typically only a factor of two. (Jones, 2016-109) 
B. Conduct unrestricted, exploratory, open-ended research into Mars life support 
Much past life support research and analysis has been preprogrammed and over controlled. It has been common 
to define the assumptions, specify the data and methods, and dictate the conclusions.  
The original plan for the work reported here had a predefined assumption, goal, method, and expected results. 
These were: 
1. ISS life support can be improved so as to be useable for Mars transit.  
2. The goal of improving ISS life support is to reduce the spare parts and crew time needed for 
maintenance and repairs. 
3. The method is to gather ISS data on failure and maintenance events to identify the troublesome parts.  
4. The result would be that investments would be recommended to improve the operating life and 
reliability of the identified parts. 
The work of Bagdigian et al. and others followed this same plan, which can be criticized. One problem is that the 
assumption, goal, method, and expected results all were mistaken, at least for the ISS OGA:  
1. ISS OGA would not be not usable for Mars transit. It doesn’t save significant mass. It has different 
requirements.  
2. Spares logistics and crew time are important, especially for ISS in its operational phase, but they are 
only two resources that must factor in the overall system design trade-offs needed to meet Mars 
requirements. The optimum design for ISS is not the optimum for Mars. 
3. The ISS OGA is well understood by the OGA engineers, who have identified its problems and 
recommended solutions. The problems extend well beyond troublesome parts and require redesign.  
4. In well designed, well tested, long operational systems, failures are random and infrequent and the rates 
are well known, so the system can be kept operational using a stock of spares sized using the known 
failure rates. But new unique systems also have failures due to design errors, defective components, 
unexpected environmental impacts, and operational errors. These can repeat and cascade and so are 
usually called common cause failures. Common cause failures by definition are any that would defeat 
the use of redundant parts. Design changes are often needed and would be very difficult during a 
mission. The ISS OGA has had and still has failures and problems requiring redesign.  
Predefining the methods and conclusions is not a good research method. It would be better to follow a more 
scientific approach, which tests rather than accepts assumptions, and which encourages open debate rather than 
conformity to consensus conclusions.  
C. Next steps 
There are useful next steps in planning life support for Mars. These include: 
1. Do a top-down, end-to-end look at life support requirements for Mars. Without predefined 
requirements, it was difficult to evaluate the ISS OGA for Mars transit. The requirements should focus 
on mission level performance including costs, safety, and operability. They should in no way constrain 
implementation.  
2. Consider the reliability, maintainability, and redundancy approach for Mars life support. It is generally 
understood that the ISS maintenance approach using ORUs is unsatisfactory. Each large ORU repairs 
only a single failure. It is thought that lower level maintenance would be better, but the best approach 
for Mars is not clearly understood.  
3. Use the NASA project phasing and systems engineering approach. First define the requirements and 
then do the systems engineering trade-offs to identify the best system to meet requirements at the 
minimum cost, including dollars, launch mass, and crew time.  Candidate solutions should be tested 
against the requirements and each other.  
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Conclusion 
Using the ISS oxygen generation system is not a feasible approach for Mars transit. It would produce less than 
its own weight in oxygen, so it would not save much launch mass. Saving launch mass is a much more achievable 
goal than saving cost, so the ISS oxygen generation system would probably cost more than oxygen in tanks if used 
for Mars transit.  
The ISS oxygen generation system requires a significant redesign for satisfactory operation on the space station. 
The planned extensive improvements would be insufficient for Mars because Mars life support has significantly 
different requirements than ISS. These include lower mass, better reliability and maintainability, greater safety, 
radiation hardening, and capability for quiescent operation.  
The standard NASA systems engineering process was not used to evaluate employing the space station oxygen 
generation system for Mars transit. It was assumed that using the space station oxygen generation system was 
sufficient.  
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